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The Hidden Foster Care System:
A Parallel System in Legal Limbo During A
Deadly Pandemic
Megan Schmidt*
In 2020, Josh Gupta-Kagan’s article on the American Hidden Foster
System challenged the welfare system to face its coercive practices that
effectuate in a child being removed from the home without formal state
intervention and court oversight.1 Families find themselves struggling to
stay together as child protection workers utilize threats and safety plans
to force the removal of a child from the home and into the custody of a
family member.2 The children’s, the parents’, and the kinship caregivers’
lives are forever impacted by the welfare state, yet they receive insufficient
benefits or protections afforded to families, caregivers, and children
placed in licensed foster care under the jurisdiction of the court.3 This
paper will explore what Gupta-Kagan coined the “American Hidden
Foster system”4 during the COVID era, as well as some solutions to the
injustices these families face while in the system. Lastly, this paper hopes
to offer an approach to balance the inevitable tension that surfaces when
child welfare agencies push for “under the table” removals while
impoverished families desperately try to stay together.
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INTRODUCTION

The foster care system is a large institution involved in the business of
child welfare that varies greatly from state to state.5 This national system
is “a complex bureaucratic apparatus of private and public agencies that
monitors parents or caregivers for actual, perceived, and prospective
abuse, abandonment, and neglect.”6 Every year, state agencies separate
more than 250,000 children from their parents and place them in formal
foster care.7 In the formal foster care system, the children are in the state’s
legal custody under the oversight of a family court judge.8 To remove
children from their family, the child welfare system must balance the
parents’ fundamental right to family integrity with the state’s parens
patriae power to protect children from abuse and neglect.9 This balancing
act is subjected to a complex body of federal and state laws that require
court hearings, which examine child safety and parental fitness.10 What
remains clear is that the formal foster care system is a poor substitute
caregiver for these abused and neglected children when they are removed
from their families.11
Even more so, the placement of children in foster care triggers a
variety of state costs from payments to foster parents for taking care of the
children to services for the children and their parents to assist in
reunification.12 According to Gupta-Kagan, “the partial accounting of such
costs – including payments to foster parents and some services for children
in addition to agency administrative costs, but excluding reunification
services for parents – reveals an average annual cost of more than $25,000
per child in foster care.”13 The federal government, in part, reimburses
state agencies through Title-IV, which results in the federal government
having substantial influence over state child welfare policy decisions.14
5

See generally, Ashley Riegle, Ashan Singh, & Allie Yang, For Foster Kids, COVID19 Poses A Second Obstacle To Stability And Success, ABC NEWS (Nov. 23, 2020, 9:24
PM); see also David Dodge, Foster Care Was Always Tough. Covid-19 Made It Tougher,
NEW YORK TIMES (Jan. 8, 2021).
6
Kele Stewart & Robert Latham, COVID-19 Reflections on Resilience and Reform in
the Child Welfare System, 48 Fordham Urb. L.J. 95, 99 (2021) at 99.
7
Gupta-Kagan, supra note 1, at 847.
8
Id.
9
Id. at 843.
10
Id.
11
See Stewart & Latham, supra note 6, at 99-101. (This part of the article points to the
traumatic and lasting impacts of foster care involvement on children. It expresses that the
state fails to provide stable placement and nurturing support systems that will last into
adulthood for these children.)
12
Gupta-Kagan, supra note 1, at 884.
13
Id.
14
Id.
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Current legislative trends support the prevention of children placed in the
formal foster care system as implemented through The Family First Act in
2018, which “explicitly envisions avoiding foster care through kinship
placements” and funds “services ‘directly related to the safety,
permanence, or well-being of the child or to preventing the child from
entering foster care.’”15
As COVID-19 catalyzed a global health crisis and national recession,
the foster care system was not immune to the devastating impact of the
pandemic.16 With over 430,000 children in foster care as of 2018, experts
rightly fear that a system already overwhelmed with children is facing
challenges it may not be equipped to handle.17 According to the CEO of
First Star, a national nonprofit that supports children in foster care, the
pandemic led to caregivers closing their doors to foster placement, not
because of the child’s behaviors, but because the caregivers are now
concerned about COVID-19.18 As more and more children enter into the
foster care system, fewer families are willing to take in foster children for
fear of spreading the virus.19 Even more so, some foster families find
themselves incapable of accepting children because they are financially or
physically unable.20
State child welfare agencies worry about the rise of abuse and neglect
cases exacerbated by families being confined at home, but agencies are
finding it difficult to investigate with current safety regulations. 21 Notably,
COVID-19 has disproportionately affected Black and Brown families at
alarming rates.22 The pandemic’s racial and economic disparities, coupled
with the fact that these vulnerable classes of children are already
overrepresented within the foster care system, exemplifies the perpetual
crisis that these children and families are facing. Black and Brown families
in the foster care system are left in a legal limbo as court proceedings
remain halted and agency services discontinued or moved remotely.23 Yet,
children continue to be removed from their families.24 A global pandemic
15

Id.at 894 (citing to Family Services Act § 50711(a)(2), 132 Stat. at 232-33 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 671(e)(1))).
16
See Riegle, Singh, & Yang, supra note 5.
17
Roxanna Asgarian, Revealing the Hidden Side of Foster Care, CENTER FOR HEALTH
JOURNALISM (July 23, 2020), see also, Riegle, Singh, & Yang, supra note 5.
18
Riegle, Singh, & Yang, supra note 5.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Char Adams, Foster Care Crisis: More Kids Are Entering, But Fewer Families Are
Willing To Taken Them In, NBC (Dec. 30, 2020 6:00 AM).
22
See Riegle, Singh, & Yang, supra note 5; see also Adams, supra note 21.
23
Angie Schwartz & Cathy Krebs, The Risk of Hidden Foster Care During COVID-19,
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (June 1, 2020).
24
Adams, supra note 21.
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does not relieve the federal or state government from the moral and legal
obligations to protect abused, abandoned, or neglected children who
require state intervention and services after removal from the homes of
parents or guardians.25
But, there is a practice that promotes circumvention of the foster care
system and its legal duties while displacing children in a pandemic with
little court or agency supervision.26 With legislation and statutes that
promote cost-cutting and foster-care prevention, a parallel system is
gaining attention from child welfare experts who fear the rise of what
Professor Josh Gupta-Kagan calls, “America’s Hidden Foster Care
System,” during the COVID era.27 The system mirrors the traditional
foster care system in both size and scope.28 This Note reviews GuptaKagan’s article and considers the grave impacts of coercive removals on
impoverished families. Like in the formal foster care system, these
removals occur roughly hundreds of thousands of times every year.29 The
impact of fracturing families remains the same.30 However, this system
utilizes coercion used by agencies in their imposition of safety-plans
towards parents to remove children from their homes.31 The lack of data
has legal advocates concerned that budget tightening due to the
pandemic’s economic effects will increase the scope of these removals.32
Legal advocates worry that this hidden foster care system continues to
grow without any sense of how the children are affected or how much
support these families are excluded from receiving due to the fact that the
system operates without court oversight of case plans.33
These cases fall under many different names, such as “kinship
diversion” or “informal kinship”, but they all start with the same premise:
the child-welfare agency receives a report that a child was abused or
neglected, and the agency dispatches a child protective worker to
investigate the situation.34 The child protection worker, who is often over25

See generally Stewart & Latham, supra note 6.
See generally Gupta-Kagan, supra note 2.
27
Id.
28
Roxanna Asgarian, Hidden Foster Care: All of The Responsibility, None of the
Resources, THE APPEAL (Dec. 21, 2020), https://theappeal.org/hidden-foster-care/; see also
Gupta-Kagan, supra note 1, at 856.
29
Josh Gupta-Kagan, How the Biden Administration Can Address Hidden Foster Care,
THE IMPRINT (Dec. 21, 2020, 11:45 AM), https://imprintnews.org/child-welfare-2/howbiden-administration-address-hidden-foster-care/50487.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Asgarian, supra note 28.
33
ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, The Kinship Diversion Debate: Policy and Practice
Implications for Children, Families, and Child Welfare Agencies (Jan. 1. 2013),
https://www.aecf.org/resources/the-kinship-diversion-debate/.
34
Gupta-Kagan, supra note 1, at 843.
26
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worked and underpaid, then makes the decision to file a petition against
the parents for abuse or neglect. Thus, the child protection worker begins
the legal process to remove the child.35 However, it is at the point of the
petition where the formal foster care system and the hidden foster care
system diverge. Some children begin a process that has legal oversight,
agency accountability, financial funding, and due process through the
court system.36 Meanwhile, others are subjected to safety plans or threats
of legal action that effectuate a change in physical custody from their
parents to kinship caregivers. These removals occur without any guarantee
of reunification.37 The parents’ and the child’s legal rights are
circumvented because parents fear never being reunified or losing parental
rights over their children if they do not comply with the agency’s request.38
While the child’s physical custody changes, the child’s legal custody status
is left in limbo.39
The child’s legal custody is left in limbo for multiple factors that
prioritize keeping the family together and the state out of the family.
Gupta-Kagan emphasizes that “kinship arrangements sometimes reflect
parents’ true wishes and the best option for children . . . ,” like Laura and
her husband, fictive kin, who took in a young baby from a close friend
who suffered from substance abuse problems and could not provide a
stable home for her child.40 Like the formal foster care system, the hidden
foster care system relies greatly on informal kinships and kinship
diversions.41 Informal kinship occurs when a parent transfers physical
custody of their child to the care of a family member, typically without
court involvement.42 The legal custody of the child remains with the

35

Id. at 874.
Id.
37
Angie Schwartz & Cathy Krebs, Addressing Hidden Foster Care: The Human Impact
and Ideas for Solutions, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (Mar. 31, 2020),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/childrensrights/articles/2020/addressing-hidden-foster-care-the-human-impact-and-ideas-forsolutions/.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Asgarian, supra note 28 (This article tells the story of Laura and her husband who
were asked to take in 1-year-old Sophie from her mother’s care. The biological mother
needed help providing a stable home for the baby. The mother was continuously in and out
of rehabilitative services without success. Laura and her husband spent thousands of dollars
in legal fees trying to stabilize Sophies placement. This story demonstrates the desperate
need for the child’s legal stability as well as kinship caregivers need for support).
41
Kinship Diversion: A Parallel System of Foster Care, CHILD WELFARE MONITOR
(March 9, 2020), https://childwelfaremonitor.org/2020/03/09/kinship-diversion-a-parallelsystem-of-foster-care/.
42
Asgarian, supra note 28.
36
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parents.43 Thus, informal kinship caregivers face challenges when making
decisions for the child.44 The idea is that the children are better off being
cared for by people who are familial and culturally familiar.45 Much
research exists to support the benefits of kinship placement for children,
and these children’s families are forced to weigh those benefits against the
difficult realities of poverty, racism, and the global pandemic.46 The
majority of kinship families live in poverty and desperately need
supportive services.47 However, informal kinships do not typically receive
the same amount of funding or services as formal kinship foster care.48
Gupta-Kagan’s article took the child welfare system by storm and
exposed the desperate circumstances that parents face in the hidden foster
care system. This Note will expand on the due process issues that occur
when coercive methods are used to force “voluntary” transfers of physical
custody. It will expose the child safety and welfare concerns that plague
America’s hidden foster care. To continue, the Note will further explain
the barriers kinship care givers face and the practices that prioritize formal
kinship arrangements. The Note analyzes the known problems of the
hidden foster care with the nuances of a COVID-19 America. However,
this Note recognizes and accepts that the hidden foster care system can
have benefits. It does not call for the abolition of the system. Specifically,
the Note will touch on the benefits of informal kinship care such as its
policy benefits and child welfare benefits. It recognizes that informal
kinship provides opportunities for Black, Immigrant, Indigenous, and
impoverished families to stay together without the crippling weight of
state oversight. Rather, the Note seeks to reduce licensing barriers that
ultimately will help some of the “hidden” placements become formal,
expand the right to counsel for both parents and children, promote
community-care programs, and utilize technology to increase accessibility
and services. The Note heavily relies on Gupta-Kagan’s extensive research
on the system and in part reviews it, while the Note expands his thoughts
to meet a COVID-19 America.

43

Gupta-Kagan, supra note 1, at 845.
ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, supra note 33, at 12.
45
Dorthy E. Roberts, Kinship Care and the Price of State Support for Children, 76 CHI.KENT L. REV. 1619 (2001).
46
Asgarian, supra note 28; see also Schwartz & Krebs, supra note 23.
47
Asgarian, supra note 28.
48
Id.
44
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PROBLEMS WITH DUE PROCESS

a.
Substantive and Procedural Due Process: A Brief Familial
Perspective
The Constitution affords protection to the parental right to family
integrity through the 14th Amendment.49 Federal state actors are prohibited
from obstructing citizens’ rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness without due process.50 From the general principle of liberty
within the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme
Court secured parents’ superior right to “establish a home and bring up
children.”51 According to Professor Josh Gupta-Kagan, “any state action
that interferes with parental authority over children . . . raises substantive
and procedural due process concerns.”52 The Supreme Court precedent
supports the notion that parents have a fundamental right to the control,
care, and custody of their children.53 Similarly, children also have the
fundamental right to live in their parents’ custody.54 Because of Due
Process, it is required that a hearing occurs prior to the deprivation of a
parent’s fundamental interest in the care and custody of their child.55 Here,
the hidden foster care presents both substantive and procedural due
process problems. The hidden foster care system dodges court hearings
that would otherwise be constitutionally required.56 There is an avoidance
of court oversight that threatens the due process rights of both parents and
children.57

b.

The Trick of “Voluntariness”

As previously mentioned, the hidden foster care system and the formal
foster care system diverge when the child protective worker makes the
determination that a child must be removed from the home but fails to file
a petition against the parents.58 It is at this moment that the parents’ and
the child’s due process rights are jeopardized by a state actor.59 Then, the
49

Wendy Jennings, Separating Families Without Due Process: Hidden Child Removals
Closer to Home, 22 CUNY L. REV. 1 (2019).
50
Id.
51
Sacha M. Coupet, “Ain’t I A Parent?”: The Exclusion of Kinship Caregivers from the
Debate over Expansions of Parenthood, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 595 (2010).
52
Gupta-Kagan, supra note 1, at 860.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Jennings, supra note 49, at 31.
56
See id.
57
See id.
58
Gupta-Kagan, supra note 1, at 844.
59
Id.
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child protective worker threatens the parents with legal action unless the
child is removed from the home.60 In an alternative scenario, the child
protective worker offers the parent the opportunity to “voluntarily” sign a
safety plan that effectuates a change in the child’s placement to a kinship
caregiver.61 Here, the parents are faced with a decision: sign the safety plan
and face the removal of their child, or avail themselves and their children
to the hands of the state.62 This evasion of due process happens almost as
frequently as formal removals.63 Evidence shows that for every ten
children entered into foster care, seven children are diverted to kinship
care.64
Diversion advocates acknowledge a great imbalance of power with
system involvement and its negative impact on families.65 Many critics of
kinship diversion find the characterization of the diversion as a “choice”
to be grossly misleading.66 Others fear that so long as the parents are
dealing with a state agency that has the power to remove their child, there
is no real choice.67 According to a report provided by the Annie E. Casey
Foundation, “birth parent advocates also argue that once the government
intervenes in the lives of families, a child’s parents lose any meaningful
choice regarding the child’s placement.”68 It suggests that there is always
a level of coercion when the state is involved.69
“The social work goals of safety planning include ‘increas[ing] family
engagement.’”70 This goal expresses that safety plans are supposed to
improve families and their unification.71 Yet, Gupta-Kagan’s article
suggests that safety plans are a vessel for the child welfare agencies’
coercion into child removals without due process and fail to meet the
social work goals of safety planning.72 Generally, these safety plans are
created without the provision of counsel for the parents.73 In this process,
the parents typically do not discuss with a lawyer the validity of child
protective services’ threats or the ability to succeed in a court hearing.74
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74

Id.
Schwartz & Krebs, supra note 37.
Id.
Asgarian, supra note 28.
Schwartz & Krebs, supra note 37.
ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, supra note 33, at 4.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Gupta-Kagan, supra note 1.
Id. at 849.
Id.
Id. at 852.
Id.
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While making the safety plan, parents lack the legal help to negotiate the
terms of the safety plan, such as visitation terms, duration, decision
authority and so forth.75 These safety plans are supposed to be voluntary;
however, with the uneven bargaining power of the state, the voluntariness
of the safety plans are suspect.
The courts tried to acknowledge the issue of coercion and due process
within the hidden foster care system, more specifically regarding coercive
safety plans. All federal courts agree that legally unjustifiable threats
inducing a change in a child’s physical custody are a violation of the
parent’s due process rights.76 The courts diverge when determining
whether the practice is coercive when the threats are legally justifiable.
Two notable cases rule against the idea that the practice is coercive: Dupuy
v. Samuels and Smith v. Williams-Ash.77
In Dupuy v. Samuels, a class action suit by parents claimed that
Illinois’ child-welfare agency’s practices of removing children from
homes through safety plans infringed on the parental rights as protected
by the due process clause of the 14th Amendment.78 The trial court findings
included multiple details that casted doubt on whether these safety plans
were actually voluntary.79 The CPS agency, both in writing and verbally,
threatened parents with the removal of their children if they failed to
agree.80 The safety plan durations were unknown and there was little
procedure to contest these plans through the agency.81 None the less, the
court held that hidden foster care is the result of voluntary choices by
parents to temporarily relinquish physical custody of their child.82 In
Dupuy, the court employed the logic that the agencies are not coercive but
rather giving the parents possible options.83 Seventh Circuit rejected the
class action plaintiffs’ challenge to the frequent method of threatening to
remove children if the parents did not agree to change a child’s physical
custody to a kinship caregiver through a safety plan.84
Similarly, the court in Smith v. William-Ash ruled that a safety plan
shifting physical custody of children to family friends was voluntary.85 In
Smith, parents brought an action against a county social worker after
75

Id.
Id.
77
See id. at 856.; see also Dupuy v. Samuels, 397 F.3d 493 (7th Cir. 2005); Smith v.
Williams-Ash, 520 F.3d 596 (6th Cir. 2008).
78
Dupuy, 397 F.3d at 496.
79
Gupta-Kagan, supra note 1, at 862.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Gupta-Kagan, supra note 1.
84
Id. at 861.
85
See id. at 865.; see also Smith v. Williams-Ash, 520 F.3d 596, 597-98 (6th Cir. 2008).
76
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children were removed from their home because of unsanitary conditions,
arguing that their due process rights were violated because they did not
receive a hearing before the removal.86 The district court granted summary
judgement in favor of the social worker, which supported that the parents
were not entitled to a hearing because they consented to removing their
children via the voluntary safety plan.87 The Sixth Circuit held that the
temporary removal of children from a home and an inability to recover
them after such removal did not violate the due process rights of the
parents.88
However, the Smith dissent points to a logic, which is supported by
Third Circuit case law, which views the child protective worker’s actions
as going well beyond a threat to enforce a valid legal right.89 In Croft v.
Westmoreland County Children and Youth Services, the Third Circuit held
that safety plans hinging on a threat of removal are inherently coercive and
must require some form of due process protections for families.90 The
Third Circuit pointed to evidence showing ways in which CPS authorities
were acting beyond their legal authority.91 Croft also suggests that no CPS
threat of removal could lead to a truly voluntary safety plan.92
In the hidden foster care system, the options are merely illusions of
choice. Parents may be more likely to submit to coercive practices because
of the constant instability that the pandemic brings. Factors that are
requirements in reunification with parents like stable employment and
house are difficult to find in COVID-19 America.93 Gupta-Kagan
acknowledges that parent fear they may not be able to withstand a court
hearing and may forever lose their children to the foster care system.94 The
pressure to say yes to “voluntary” safety-plans may seem like the only
option to parents who are already struggling through poverty, racism, and
a global health crisis.

III.

CHILD SAFETY AND WELFARE ISSUES

There is no evidence to suggest that kin placements are less safe than
other placements.95 As forementioned, there is copious evidence to support
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95

See Smith, 520 F.3d. at 597-98.
Id.
Id. at 599-600.
Id at 601-02 (Gilman, J., dissenting).
103 F.3d 1123, 1125 n.1 (3rd Cir. 1997); see Gupta-Kagan, supra note 1, at 866.
Gupta-Kagan, supra note 1, at 867.
Id.
Stewart & Latham, supra note 6.
Gupta-Kagan, supra note 1, at 873.
ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, supra note 33, at 18.
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the benefits of kinship placements over non-familial placements.96
However, the lack of state oversight for these informal kinships, which the
state induced, leaves the door open for children to be neglected and
abused.97 This proves especially troubling when the hidden foster care has
no legal checks or balances to the child protective workers’ determinations
of the child’s well-being.98 Also, without the legal process, these removals
can occur with little to no evidence that the circumstances would warrant
a child’s removal.99 Without due process, it is difficult to confirm that the
children in hidden foster care are there for their welfare and safety. Rather,
the hidden foster care brings more benefits to the formal foster care system
and its financial bottom-line.100
The foster care system has a duty to ensure the safety of abused or
neglected children; however, the child welfare agencies’ reliance on the
hidden foster care system circumvents that duty to the children.101 Unlike
formal foster care, the child welfare agencies have no legal requirement to
make reasonable efforts toward reunification of families.102 The agencies
do not develop case plans prescribing how parents may reunify with their
children.103 Kinship placements are not investigated as thoroughly and are
not subjected to welfare checks.104 Thus, the children are left vulnerable to
further trauma and possible intergenerational abuses.105
This Note also argues that to be in a legal limbo is not in the best
interest of the child. The informal removals split the child’s custody in
two, where their legal custody remains with their parents and their physical
custody with the kinship caregiver.106 The caregiver’s access to making
decision about the child’s education and health insurance becomes more
difficult.107 Furthermore, with the child’s legal status in limbo, there is
nothing the hidden foster care can do to stop parents who are truly
dangerous from taking back custody of their child.108 The informal kinship
caregivers in the hidden foster care system are left with no legal leverage
96

Id.
Asgarian, supra note 28.
98
Gupta-Kagan, supra note 1, at 875.
99
Id. at 876.
100
CHILD WELFARE MONITOR, supra note 41.
101
Gupta-Kagan, supra note 29.
102
Id.
103
CHILD WELFARE MONITOR, supra note 41.
104
Id.
105
ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, supra note 33, at 17.
106
Id. at 7.
107
Alliance for Children’s Rights, The Human Impact of Bypassing Foster Care for AtRisk Children: Building a Continuum of Support for Families Diverted, STEP UP FOR KIN
(Feb. 28, 2020), https://stepupforkin.org/hiddenfostercare/.
108
Gupta-Kagan, supra note 1,at 881.
97
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to protect the child. Unfortunately, their custody is physical only, not
legal.109 If the family wanted to effectuate a private kinship, they would
have to incur the costs of that legal proceeding.110
In addition, during the pandemic, the courts closed in many states,
which has slowed reunification processes, adoptions, and licensing.111
Now more than ever, the parents who have been forced into the hidden
foster care system face decreased access to the courts. While their children
were effectually removed by the state, these kinship families neither have
the access to COVID testing that the state may provide, nor the
consideration that social workers must have for the health needs and risk
statuses of the people involved.112 Both the traditional foster care system
and the hidden foster care system pose great public health threats to at-risk
children.
The conditions of the informal kinship care are in stark contrast to
those of formal kinship foster care. If the families were in formal kinship,
they would receive those benefits as well as a substantial monthly stipend.
In formal kinship foster care, the family would have access to services and
additional foster care subsidies.113 It is not sufficient to say that formal
kinship is what is in the child’s best interest. Kinship foster care makes the
child a ward of the state.114 The child’s legal custody transfers to child
welfare agencies.115 The kinship foster care families receive a large
amount of oversight and relinquish a substantial amount of control over
the child.116 In general, families’ inconsistent and negative experiences
with the welfare system are often enough to avoid the financial benefits of
formal kinship.117 Informal kinship may be an appropriate choice for some
families who would not survive the state’s intrusion. Rather, the true
question remains whether the child welfare system, in its current state, can
truly guarantee children’s safety and welfare.
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LACK OF FINANCIAL AND SERVICE SUPPORT FOR KIN
CAREGIVERS

Just because a kinship placement is typically better for the child does
not mean that all kinship caregivers can manage the complex needs of the
child without additional support. A majority of kinship caregivers live in
poverty.118 A large percentage of these informal placements are the
families of under-represented communities. Particularly, the Black
community’s long history of communal care for children is taken
advantage of in the system of kinship diversion.119 The idea that family
should take care of family is an important one, but it hinders communities
when the ideology excludes certain caregivers from financial and service
support.120 In the hidden foster system, child welfare agencies prioritize
kinship diversion over foster care because it saves the state and federal
government millions of dollars.121
In kinship foster care, the kin receive foster parent licenses, financial
funding, and services that are not accessible in private kinship
arrangements. The financial support given to informal arrangements is
limited to Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and is much
less substantial than what is provided to their formal counter parts.122 The
caregivers are expected to take on the great costs of childcare as well as
the specialized needs of an abused or neglected child.123 While formal
kinship placements may benefit from therapeutic services provided by the
state, informal kinship caregivers, at most, are referred to support groups
and kinship diversion programs.124 Moreover, kinship placements are
poorly compensated by the state in comparison to traditional foster
homes.125 For example, in Texas, kinship caregivers are entitled to less
than half the money per child that a licensed nonrelative foster parent
receives for a basic level of care.126 For those that took in children without
a Child Protective Services case, they often receive nothing.127
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BENEFITS OF INFORMAL KINSHIP

Policy and Cultural Benefits

While this Note focuses on kinship agreements that the state
informally effectuates, not all informal kinships are involuntary and
coercive. In many instances, there are great benefits to informal kinship.
Many placements happen organically.128 Families are free to define their
care structures for their children.129 Kinship caregiving is significantly
more common in the United States than it was decades ago.130 Rates of
kinship caregiving participation appear higher in urban areas like New
York City, Detroit, Chicago, and Los Angeles.131 However, only a small
minority of children residing with their relatives are in a formal
arrangement through the foster care system.132 In America, millions of
children live in kinship households, but only an estimated 131,000
children are in formal placements.133
Kinship has a long history that is woven into the norms of many
cultures.134 Informal kinship is particularly prevalent in the Black
Community.135 The Anglo-American ideal of the nuclear family model
was not traditional amongst Black families.136 The ideology that the
community shares responsibility for its children has historical roots in the
traditions brought by enslaved people to the United States.137 They believe
in shared parenting across generations.138 Kinship caregiving practices are
part of a range of strategies that Black families use to cope with economic,
social, and political pressure.139 Their strength and support for their
community allows Black families to manage life stressors like poverty and
discrimination.140 Social scientists have revered the success of Black kin
networks’ abilities to meet the challenges of raising children under
immense stress and racism.141
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Policy wise, kinship caregiving preserves family, community, and
cultural ties.142 In the Family First Act passed in 2018, Congress also
promoted foster care prevention.143 A good number of jurisdictions and
child protection workers are opposed to kinship foster care because they
believe it creates a system that “pays relatives to care for their family
members.”144 To continue, informal kinship prevents children from
becoming wards of the state.145 The government incentivizes low-cost and
safe child placements out of the foster care system.146 Also, during the
pandemic, states are likely to face severe budget cuts that may increase the
likelihood of the use of the hidden foster care system.147 The child welfare
system is greatly flawed in that it is punitive to the family by nature and it
assumes that parents are solely responsible for the care of their children.148
During COVID-19, family placements are even more needed as kinship
placements are more likely to take entire sibling groups together rather
than separating the children and further traumatizing them.149 Similarly,
the pandemic has made frequent and adequate visitation a particular issue
in foster care.150 Kinship families are dedicated to assist the children in
their care remaining connected to their parent through safe, socially distant
or virtual means.151

b.

Mental Health Benefits

The removal process of a child from the custody of their parents to the
foster care system is traumatic.152 When children are removed and
transferred to a new environment, children are too often traumatized.153 As
the children are placed with strangers, they feel a sense of loss and
ambiguity.154 Children in non-kinship placements are more at risk for
physical abuse as well as emotional and medical neglect.155 Similarly, the
removal process has negative mental and social health outcomes on the
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parent.156 For example, mothers whose children were removed and placed
in foster care have increased rates of anxiety and substance use disorder
diagnoses within two years of being separated.157 Institutions are not
meant to raise children. Studies show that children raised in an institution
like the foster care system exhibit higher incidences of psychosocial
disorders and face difficulties in building relationships with others.158 The
horrible impact of children in formal foster care is often irreversible. 159
These negative consequences of the formal foster care system can be
circumvented with the use of informal kinship placements.
Children in kinship caregiving families enjoy positive mental health
benefits. Data from the National Survey of Child and Adolescent WellBeing shows that these placements demonstrate better outcomes for
children on physical, cognitive, and skills-based domains in comparison
to nonrelative placements.160 The children also report having more positive
perceptions of their placement.161 They report liking who they live with
and feeling loved by their caregivers.162 These children are also less likely
to run away.163 In their familial placements, the children perceive a greater
deal of love, safety, and stability than those placed with non-kin.164

VI.
a.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

Increasing Community Care and Kinship Support

Black and impoverished families need the space to develop their
families. The paternalistic foster care system stifles their familial
structures. When considering solutions to the child welfare system, the
best solution would come from those who are most impacted by it.
Therefore, because Black families are grossly over-represented in the
system, it is essential that they are the engineers of reform and progress
instead of detached, White legislators. Alan Dettlaff, the head of the
University of Houston’s Graduate School of Social Work and a founder of
a network of organizations that promote the abolishment of the child
welfare system, states, “it’s about trusting Black families and communities
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to take care of their children.”165 He suggests that financial support can be
given directly to the families in need rather than to non-relative foster
parents in the welfare system.166
Advocates for kinship care believe that state custody and the strictures
of licensed foster care should not be the only path for these caregivers to
receive specialized support.167 They argue that community-based services
should be available to all kinship families in an equitable, need-based
fashion.168 Services that prioritize involvement in the formal foster care
system over need neglect so many informal kinship families across the
United States.169 In the COVID-19 era, the families who may be enduring
dire health and safety circumstances are excluded from the already-limited
resources that are only available to formal kinship placements.170 The
community-based model of support focuses on building a more consistent
network of support groups for the families, as well as on better
coordinating existing government support.171 The intent is to give families
access to the resources on their own terms and needs without state-forced
intervention.172 The support of more community-based care groups and
services can create a more equitable system of supplying services to needy
families.

b.

Expanding the Right to Counsel

Parents already have a right to counsel in proceedings of neglect and
abuse.173 However, this right may arrive too late for those whose safety
plans and kinship diversion never trigger a legal process.174 Gupta-Kagan
in reference to the hidden foster care states, “[b]ecause no court oversight
follows, there are no checks and balances on the agency’s decision that
children must be separated from their parents. No lawyers for the parents
challenge whether the parent truly abused or neglected the child, whether
any maltreatment threatened imminent harm, or whether alternatives to a
parent-child separation existed, and no judges determine whether such a
separation is truly necessary.”175 Thus, to prevent the negative
consequences of such interaction between a state actor and a parent that
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results in the removal of a child should trigger a right to counsel, regardless
if an official petition was filed.176 The Children’s Bureau made federal
funding available for pre-petition representation.177 Also, the Biden
Administration should collaborate with the states to ensure that parents are
appointed such representation.178 The appointment of pre-petition counsel
ensures that these separations occur only when in the best interest of the
parent, when necessary, and when legally justifiable.179 Lawyers are
essential to parents who need help navigating and negotiating safety
plans.180
All children should be granted the right to counsel when the
involvement of a state actor results in their removal from the home. This
solution, like the parent’s right to counsel, acts as a barrier against due
process violations from the state. Several states explicitly require the
appointment of legal counsel for the child in neglect and abuse
proceeding.181 This Note argues that the appointment of legal counsel for
these proceedings should be federally mandated to protect the rights and
interests of the child. The child’s wishes are important and often
determinative in cases, as the child is a party in the proceedings.182 This
right to counsel will empower the children.183 Rather than leaving the
children legal limbo, their counsel ensures that the child’s wishes are
considered or at least that the child can access the Court.184 The desire for
children to have counsel stems from an empowerment rights perspective
that recognizes the child’s power and autonomy.185 According to this
perspective, the removal of a child over the child’s objections would be an
unacceptable response to allegations of abuse or neglect, especially if the
child never has their day in court.186 In a system where practices are racist
and classist187, the child represented by independent counsel who
advocates for their client’s wishes serves as a safeguard from an overly
paternalistic system.188 Instead of perpetuating the children’s
176
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vulnerabilities and dependencies, the attorney has a legal responsibility to
take those children’s wishes and claims seriously.189
Legal representation improves the parties’ engagement in the case.190
It can lead to individualized safety plans that consider the interests of the
parent and the child.191 Furthermore, having all parties legally represented
is likely to trigger internal improvement for Child Protective Services
agencies.192 When external lawyers become involved, internal agency
lawyers become involved too, allowing for the better counselling of child
protection workers.193 Legal representation can often accelerate the
process and provide positive outcomes.194 Finally, the Children’s Bureau
expanded Title IV-E funding eligibility that would allow parents to receive
representation.195 This reform expands the possibility of significant raises
in funding so that both parent and child representation is possible.196 The
costs are simply worth incurring when it is pertinent to a fundamental,
constitutional right.

c.

Reducing Barriers in Licensing of Foster Parents

Foster care licenses require a lot of effort to acquire.197 They place a
great burden on the foster parents trying to achieve them.198 Some of the
licensing barriers are inherently exclusionary toward impoverished
families.199 Others are overly paternalistic and ethnocentric to the AngloAmerican ideal of family. The policy intent behind licensing standards is
ensuring the appropriate and safe placements of foster children.200
However, the licensing system in its current state is discouraging possible
kinship caregivers from utilizing formal kinship, as it relies on standards
that pertain more to wealth and cultural bias than safety.201 In this situation,
the hidden foster care system becomes the only practical alternative to
keep children with caring relatives.202 Changes to the licensing system can
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incentivize families to partake in formal kinship. In general, the changes
can improve the foster care system’s inclusivity.203
Licensing homes for foster care placements create a plethora of
barriers that could scare away kin caregivers and parents who wish to
receive financial benefits and services from the state. These families may
fear that the kin may not meet the licensing requirements.204 Then, the
families are left with no choice but to remain in the hidden foster care
system.205 Furthermore, the lack of federal oversight of this system has
allowed for dramatic variations in licensing from state to state.206 For
example, Arkansas, Colorado, Missouri, Nevada, Oklahoma, and Utah all
have standards that may potentially cause discrimination again rural
families.207 Some standards, such as the aforementioned, are problematic
and simply not necessary.
Especially in COVID-19 where formal foster placements are harder to
find, the Note argues that some of the standards must be reformed or
abolished altogether. Initial training standards, which require foster
families to receive some form of prior training, must become consistent
and accessible to families who struggle to attend the trainings.208 Home
studies rely on subjective opinions from case management that can
promote cultural bias.209 Furthermore, strict square footage requirements
act as an arbitrary licensing barrier and should be removed.210 Size
requirements are inherently classist and ethnocentric. Different cultures
utilize space and living arrangements differently, but that does not
automatically translate into an inability for certain people to be adequate
caregivers. As some states do not require substantiated evidence or support
before denying a license over an indictment, open or pending case of abuse
or neglect, abuse and neglect background checks require federal
uniformity.211 Pursuant to the Adam Walsh Protection and Safety Act of
2006, all states and the District of Colombia are required to do background
checks on foster parent applications.212 At least 21 states disqualify
potential foster parents for crimes beyond those outlined in the Walsh
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act.213 Some states, such as Florida, go so far as to prohibit driving
violations.214 Coupled with the hyper-incarceration of Black and Brown
bodies, this standard of licensing is inherently racist. The licensing
requirements should weigh the totality of the circumstances and consider
the possible rehabilitation of the kin caregiver before denying such
placements.
Finally, the Adoption and Safe Families Act prohibits a two-tiered
system of licensing that creates separate standards for relative
caregivers.215 This law requires kinship caregivers to meet the same
approval standards as non-relative foster family homes.216 The unclear
language of the Act resulted in 27 states changing their standards.217 18 of
those states implemented stricter licensing standards for relatives than
before the adoption of the Act.218 There should be a federal process that
facilitates the licensing of relatives. For example, in Hawaii, relatives are
not required to complete training prior to licensing.219 Furthermore,
procedures can be in place to expedite the process. New York’s process
allows relatives to receive a court hearing that places their child in their
care after they submit the application fairly quickly.220 In addition to an
expedited process, the states should make licensing waivers public
knowledge and more accessible. Some families are unaware that the state
can and will waive certain standards, such as not being able to speak
English, if the child protection worker determines it is appropriate.221
Kinship caregivers would do better to receive waivers that are easy to
understand and complete so that they may receive licensing.

d.

Relying on Technology

In the age of COVID-19, the reliance on technology is pivotal to our
society’s safety and success. This Note argues that the child welfare
system should utilize technology in new and creative ways to regulate the
hidden foster care system. For families already involved with the system,
multiple functions of the system were migrated to a virtual format.222
Through the use of technology, in-home services can be managed without
the need for physical intervention by the state. Similarly, user-friendly
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apps can be designed to connect informal kinship caregivers, parents, and
children with support groups and legal advice. Programs can be developed
that manage safety plans, track the plans durations, and require feedback
from the parents. This technology will also allow for agencies to begin to
track these informal placements and their outcomes. Gupta-Kagan viewed
data collection by the states to be vitally important in the informed
oversight of the hidden foster care system.223 COVID-19 may be
exasperating the foster care system, but it is also catalyzing innovative
practices within the foster care system that are less physically intrusive on
families.

VII.

CONCLUSION

The hidden foster care system is a lawless place with extremely
destructive potential. Without regulation and support, families will find
themselves at the mercy of the state. This Note maintains that the financial
incentives perpetuated by legislation and policy are insufficient motivators
for the obstruction of familial due process. The rights of families are
precious. The safety of children at risk of removal is too important to leave
hidden. This Note does not point to any single solution. While it does
divulge into some solutions, it is clear that those are not comprehensive.
Kinship caregivers require financial support and community help to
provide for these children. The complexities of the child welfare system
are endless. Some organizations believe that informal kinship care is a
solution to much of the strife that the formal foster system causes.224 These
same organizations call for the abolition of child welfare system.225 This
Note does not suggest that informal kinship is less than the formal foster
care system; rather, it argues that the hidden foster care, in its present
function, is left to the coercive devices of the state. Gupta-Kagan calls for
immediate attention from the Biden Administration to the national issue
of coercive child removal in a pandemic226, and this Note agrees that
national attention to the system is needed. The shadows of hidden foster
care are too dark to remain unregulated and underfunded, especially at the
expense of Black and Brown families.
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